Introduction
Is Bogle (2006)  Which predicted outperformance best: past outperformance, the number of Morningstar stars awarded to funds for past performance, or Wiener's (2003) sell, hold or buy recommendations?
 What was the best combination of these predictors?
Methodology
This chapter defines the tracking index fund basket (for short the tracking index) of a managed fund as that collection of indexed funds whose monthly returns most closely track the returns of the managed fund. Each Vanguard managed fund can be matched to a tracking basket of Vanguard index funds that produces the same return plus a differential. If the average differential, alpha, is positive the return of the managed fund is superior to that of the tracking index.
This chapter uses the geometric alpha. This is the amount by which the geometric average return of a mutual fund exceeds the geometric average return of its tracking index. The geometric alpha is more useful than the standard arithmetic alpha, for it measures how much the mutual fund out-returns its tracking index over the period analyzed, rather than the average annual excess return, measured by the arithmetic alpha. Two funds that have the same tracking index and total return over a time period, but different standard deviations of return will have different arithmetic alphas, but the same geometric alphas. Wiener (2006, p.186) 
provides correlations of returns between different
Vanguard equity funds to help investors reduce risk. Morningstar's (2009) portfolio instant X-Ray is also useful. It describes the composition of each managed fund as a combination of the nine style groups (from large cap value, through mid cap blend, and small cap growth), and it distinguishes between domestic and foreign equity. Here is the list of the Vanguard managed funds that have operated for this whole ten-year period and met our criteria (discussed below) for inclusion in the study: There are 18 managed funds that have existed for the whole period (the old funds) and ten additional funds that have existed for shorter periods (the young funds). These are Vanguard's diversified funds whose median proportion of assets invested in cash and bonds was less than 9% at the annual reporting times indicated on Morningstar Principia (2008) . The young funds consist of seven managed funds, an index fund that uses social screening criteria (FTSE Soc), a fund of funds (Diversified Equity), that is permitted to vary its mix of funds, and Dividend Appreciation, which as chapter 12 discusses is an enhanced index fund.
The structured funds, all of which are in the young collection, are institutional or institutional plus funds, and they do not have other share class counterparts. These are share classes like the investor or Admiral share classes and are not limited to institutions. They simply have the "institutional" share class name. They have high minimum investment levels ($5 million and $200 million respectively). While not many investors will be able to invest in them, it is worthwhile to see whether they beat the index funds, and whether less wealthy investors should lobby to have them made available, perhaps with higher fees attached for smaller accounts.
No funds, managed or indexed, were closed down during the period, so there is no survivorship bias.
The Investor share class carries higher expenses than the Admiral share class. But some funds do not have Admiral shares, so to keep the sample size large and for the sake of uniformity the study works with Investor shares.
Investors are concerned with real returns, so we adjust nominal returns by the consumer price index provided in Morningstar (2008) to get real returns.
Henceforth, "return" unless accompanied by "nominal," indicates real return. The formula used for the conversion is
where R is the real rate of return, N is the nominal rate of return, and I is the rate of inflation in the consumer price index, with all expressed as a proportion per month.
To describe the return of a managed fund (say PRIMECAP) in terms of the index fund returns, the monthly return of PRIMECAP is regressed on the monthly returns of all of the indexes, while constraining all of the coefficients of the index funds to be non-negative and to sum to one. The result is:
(2) R PRIMECAP = +4.33/12 + 0.18 R S&P500 +0. Table 2 .
Insert Table 2 about here.
The use of the tracking basket is an attempt to deal with Kizer's (2005) point that in assessing managed funds versus index funds one must compare managed performance with index performance of comparable style.
Returns are not risk adjusted. Instead, the tables simply report the standard deviations of monthly returns of the fund and the tracking index. Given alpha, the risk-averse investor will prefer the fund with the lower standard deviation.
One could follow Reinker and Tower (2004) and calculate a risk-adjusted alpha by combining a low risk asset (such as an inflation protected security) with the security (the managed fund or the tracking basket) that has the higher standard deviation of return, until the standard deviation of return for the combined portfolio fell to that of the lower standard-deviation-of-return security.
The return of the combination minus that of the lower standard-deviation-of return security is the risk-adjusted return differential. But the result depends on the lowrisk asset chosen. Moreover, the analysis may be misleading. Suppose fund A returns more each period than does fund B, but fund B has a lower standard deviation of return. Then risk adjusting fund A (using a low return, low risk asset) may bring its return below that of fund B, yet no investor would choose fund B over fund A. It is easy to see that this paradox occurs if B is almost riskless and the low-risk asset has a low return.
In Defense of Geometric Alpha
Let R 1 and R 2 be successive monthly returns, expressed as proportions.
The average arithmetic return is (R 1 +R 2 )/2, the average return each period. The average geometric return is (1+R 1 )*(1+R 2 )]
.5 -1, the common return each period that would generate the observed return over the entire time span.
The expected one-period return exceeds the expected long-period return if future returns are drawn evenly from past returns without replacement. For example, if the past annual returns were 0% and 300%, the expected one year return is the average of 0% and 300% = 150%. This is the past arithmetic rate of return. This is also the expected annual return over any number of years if we expect that the return in all future periods will be drawn randomly from past returns with replacement. To see this, recognize that in that case, after two years we expect to have returned sequences of 0% then 300%, 0% then 0%, 300% then 0% and 300% then 300% each with probabilities of 0.25%. After two years one dollar becomes an expected $6.25=(2.5)
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, for an expected annual return of 150%. However, the expected annual return over a two year span, when returns are drawn evenly from past returns is [(1+0)(1+3)]
.5 -1= 100%. This is the past geometric rate of return. It is also the expected return over many periods when future returns are drawn evenly without replacement from past returns. The reason it is lower than the expected return when expected returns are calculated from past returns with replacement is that in the replacement case, the biggest returns are occasionally married with the biggest returns, so the magic of compounding raises the expected return beyond the geometric average return.
To some extent equity prices are characterized by regression to the mean, i.e.
big returns are likely to be married with small returns in the future. If this is the case, the sensible policy is to report only geometric average returns and use them to calculate geometric alpha, and we follow it here. But the standard procedure in the literature is to use the arithmetic alpha. Kritzman (2002, chapter 4) addresses this issue and the discussion here is based on his discussion.
The arithmetic average return exceeds the geometric average return by more, the higher the standard deviation of return, so using arithmetic alphas instead of geometric averages as the performance criterion makes a fund that is more risky relative to its tracking index look more appealing relative to a fund that is less risky relative to its tracking index. Their ten-year real geometric average returns ranged from 1.17% per year to -0.08% per year, with an average of 0.34%. All of them performed less well than the three Vanguard bond funds discussed at the bottom of the table.
The Tracking Indexes for the Old Funds
Using only the S&P500 index as a benchmark for managed funds is a misguided strategy. Tables 1 and 4 (for the old and young funds, respectively)
show that all tracking baskets require at least two different index funds, and no single index fund (neither the S&P500 Index Fund nor any other) is consistently used across all managed funds. However, one index fund: Total Stock Market Index Fund, adds little explanatory power.
Most of the results from the linear regression are not surprising. For example the Growth Equity Fund invests heavily in equities highly correlated with the Growth Index Fund. However, some striking patterns arise, illuminating the management style of funds. For example, Table 1 shows that Windsor has historically invested 86% of its funds in equities linked to the Value Index Fund although Morningstar (2008) lists it as a large blend fund. Similarly, the Mid-Cap
Growth Fund held 81% of its assets in securities linked to the Extended Market Index Fund, while Morningstar describes it as a midcap growth stock, and the Growth Equity Fund is described by Morningstar (2008) as a large value fund, while it held 56% of its portfolio In assets linked to the Extended Market Index
Fund. The Dividend Growth Fund is described in Morningstar (2008) as large blend, but 77% of its securities were linked over the period to the value index. The average return differential is a positive 0.30% per year. On average the managed funds were 5% riskier than the tracking indexes, with the ratio of the managed standard deviation of monthly return to that of the tracking basket being 1.05. Hence, managed funds are more risky. This is surprising in view of the fact that managed funds tend to be less fully invested in equity than the index funds. Perhaps managed funds tend to be more risky, because they are less diversified. Referring back to the quote from John Bogle (2006) , Windsor II, which strives to improve diversification by hiring more managers, is one of the few funds that have a lower risk than its tracking basket, and it has the third lowest risk relative to its tracking basket of any managed fund in the collection. This is diversification by spreading mismanagement risk. Table 2 shows that, over the entire period, nine funds have a negative alpha and nine have a positive alpha. Capital Opportunity and PRIMECAP are the only two with a t statistic for alpha, t α , greater than 2, and U.S. Growth is the only one with a t α more negative than -2. These alphas are significantly different from zero at better than the 5% level.
Prowess of Style Jumping and Equity Choice for the Old Funds
Breaking up the period into two equal halves generates further insights. α W1 and α W2 are the alphas calculated for the first and second five year halves, with the performance of the whole 10-year period tracking index as the benchmark.
These alphas reflect the ability of the managed funds to beat the index basket that reflects average style choice over the whole ten-year period. Since they reflect prowess in both style jumping and equity choice in the two half periods, they are denoted by PSE1 and PSE2, respectively. The average of PSE1 and PSE2 is +0.30, the same as PSE, meaning that over the whole-period the prowess of style jumping and equity choice swamps transaction costs and expenses. The average of the PEs is +0.125% per year, implying that equity selection prowess swamps costs and expenses.
Dividing the whole period in two for calculating the short-period tracking benchmarks is arbitrary. It could be divided into as many as ten parts, one for each year. If managers are consistently wise style jumpers, finer divisions should generate higher values for the PSEs and lower values for the PEs. 
Prescient Style Jumping?
If managers are successful style jumpers the half-period tracking indexes will perform better than the whole period one. So if managers are wise style jumpers, the average alpha calculated for the half-period tracking indexes will be lower than the average alpha calculated for the whole-period tracking index. PS is the prowess of style jumping over the entire period. We measure it by the average of the whole alphas (α W1 and α W2 ) minus the average of the half alphas (α H1 and α H2 ) We find that PS is positive. Prescient style jumping has yielded a positive return of 0.175% per year. This prowess figure is the difference between two average alphas, both of which reflect the additional expenses and transaction costs of managed funds. Consequently, these additional expenses and transaction costs cancel out in taking the difference, so PS does not reflect them.
Thus, on average fund managers made prescient style choices.
Individuals may wish to adjust their styles in accordance with anticipated differential returns to different styles if they are able to correctly predict differential style returns. A wide range of style predictions used to be provided on the GMO web site (2009), which were evaluated in The Economist (2008) and by Tower (2008) , but the range of styles that GMO attempts to predict was narrowed in December 2008. Barras, Scaillet and Wermers (2008) argue that conventional analysis finds that more managers are able to outperform the market than is truly the case, because these studies do not correct for luck. They aggregate different share classes of the same mutual fund by assets under management. By correcting for luck, they discover that the number of managers that beat the market net of expenses has dramatically fallen over time, so virtually none existed by 2006: 0.6% of fund managers, although on a gross return basis 9.6% of mutual fund managers display market-beating ability. They (p.1)
Alpha Fell
. . . find a significant proportion of skilled (positive alpha) funds prior to 1995, but almost none by 2006, accompanied by a large increase in unskilled (negative alpha) fund managers due to both a large reduction in the proportion of fund managers with stockpicking skills and to a persistent level of expenses that exceed the value generated by these managers.
Does the BSW regularity that alpha is falling hold for Vanguard's managed funds?
Insert Table 3 about here.
The first columns of Table 3 provide the t values for the alphas of Table 2 . How have the young funds performed?
Insert Table 4 about here. 
The Best Prediction Equation
To find the best predictor a series of regressions to predict α w2 . The predictions used were α w1 , the number of Morningstar (2003) 
Is Wiener Right That Vanguard's Managed Funds are Better Than its Index Funds?
Wiener (2007) (2002) asks whether managed funds beat the index for various styles. Let's ask the same question, using our model.
For the collection of old funds, alpha is regressed on all of the coefficients that determine the tracking index, while suppressing the constant. Table 5 presents the results. The regression coefficients are labeled the alpha components. Alpha for each managed fund is explained as the sum of the alpha components, each multiplied by the corresponding tracking coefficient from Table   1 . A positive alpha component for an index fund means that the parts of managed funds that are mimicked by that index fund outperform it. So for example a managed fund that is mimicked by an equal combination of the Vanguard 500 Index Fund and the Vanguard Small-Cap Index Fund is expected to outperform it by (-.02+.28)/2 % = 0.135% per year.
Insert Table 5 It may be that individual investors can pick styles presciently. If so, that argues for slice and dice indexing combined with managed funds for parts of the market not covered by index funds, rather than exclusive use of managed funds.
Summary
 Did Vanguard's managed funds outperform their indexed counterparts?
Answer: Over the study's ten year period, the average Vanguard managed fund outperformed at first, and subsequently underperformed.
Over the entire period the average managed fund outperformed its index basket counterpart, but the median fund underperformed, and when we include the more recently introduced funds, the average active managed fund underperformed.
 Were the managers of Vanguard's active funds wise stock pickers and style jumpers? Answer: Over the last ten years, for closely tracked funds, no; and for loosely tracked funds, with large variability, yes.
 Did the degree of outperformance of a managed mutual fund predict the degree of future outperformance? Answer: Yes to some degree. Answer: Yes, and they performed better than past performance or the number of Morningstar stars awarded to funds for past performance.
Conclusion
The study found that Vanguard's index and managed equity funds are comparable.
There seems to be little reason to build a portfolio solely out of one or the other if one wishes to overweight some style categories, especially since However, the study does find support for the finding of Barras, Scaillet, and Wermers (2008) that the advantage of managed funds has declined. In the first three years of our ten-year period Vanguard's managed funds on average outperformed their tracking index fund basket. In the subsequent seven-year period they underperformed. Similarly, in the first half most of Vanguard's managed funds outperformed, and in the second half most underperformed.
Specifically, the average alpha in the first half was 0.86% per year and in the second half it was -0.43% per year. In the first half 27 out of 36 alphas were positive; in the second half 11 out of 36 alphas were positive.
The study was completed at a bad time, because it misses all the volatility of late 2008 and early 2009. It will be fruitful to see whether the regularities found here continue to hold. All index funds had slightly higher returns in the second half of the period.
For comparison over the 10 year period, the real continuously compounded returns were: Vanguard short- 2 Dividend G 59 -1.6 -0.5 0.8 -2.6 -0.5 -2.8 1.2 -0. Numbers in columns 2-9 are expressed in % pts/year.
PSE is prowess of style and equity choice over whole period. It is measured by α.
Risk of fund is measured as the standard deviation of monthly real return for the fund divided by that of the tracking index. Fund beats if less than one PSEi is prowess of style and equity choice in half i, where i =1 or 2, denoting 1st or 2nd half of period. It is measured by α Wi , where W stands for whole and means that the tracking index used for comparison is that for the entire period.
PEi denotes prowess of equity choice for period i. It is measured by α Hi , where H stands for half and means that the tracking index used for comparison is that of period i.
PS denotes prowess of style choice. It is measured by average α W minus average α H . Prowess of style and equity choice combined declined between the two periods by 1.08 percentage points. Prowess of equity choice declined between the two periods by 1.51 percentage points. Prowess of style choice rose from -.03%/year in the 1st period to 0.39%/year in the 2nd, for a gain of 0.42%/year.
Conclude:
PSEG is growth in prowess of style & equity choice between the two periods. It is calculated as α W2 -α W1 . PEG is growth in prowess of equity choice, measured as α H2 -α H1 . PSi is prowess of style choice in period i, measured as α Wi -α Hi .
PSG growth in prowess of style choice, measured as PS2-PS1.
Annual PSEG is the growth rate of α (% pts/year). It is calculated as the coefficient of annual α W regressed on year. The coefficients indicate the amount by which the managed funds do better than the indexes. Thus an index with a negative coefficient outperforms the managed fund which it mimics. , no coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 10% level. The equation is not significant. So the conclusion is that we have not discovered a style where managed funds differ significantly from index funds. Predicted alpha W2 Actual alpha W2
